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m THE

SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
A1EANE STRONG,

)

Plaintiff and
Respondent,

)
)

vs.

Case No.

16880

)

ALEXANDER D. STRONG,
)

Defendant and
Appellant.

)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENI'

This is an action in divorce :in which Appellant appeals from

the property distribution award made by the trial court.

Appellant

contends that the trial court erred in its valuation of the marital
assets,· thereby preventing an equitable distribution of the properties.
Respondent believes that the trial court correctly valued the marital
assets which were distributed to the respective parties.
DISPOSITION Ill LOWER COURI'
This divorce acti6n was tried in the Second Judicial District
Court for Weber County, State of Utah, before the Honorable Calvin
Gould, on September 21, 1979.

On October 24, 1979, Judge Gould

issued a Memorandum Decision (Record, p. 54) dividing the marital
properties between Respondent and Appellant.

The terms of this Decision
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were incorporated into the final Decree of Divorce (R.,pp. 66,67)
which was signed by Judge Gould on December 31, 1979.

RELIEF SOUGIT ON APPEAL
Respondent asks this Court to affinn the decision of the trial
court recognizing the broad latitude and discretion given the trial
judge in deciding these types of equity actions.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent basically agrees with the statement of facts contained
in Appellant's Brief but TM:>uld add in the first paragraph of
Appellant's Statement of Facts that the Appellant bas not only a
superior earning capacity but superior retirement rights as well.
(R.,p.54).

In addition a rote-tiller valued at $400 was awarded

to Appellant. (R. ,p.55).
Ai.~

POINr I - THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY VALUED THE VJEST OGDEN REAL
ESTATE CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT'S IDTHERS' ONLY INTEREST IN
SAID REAL ESTATE WAS THE $3600 OOW'N' PAYMENT WHICH SHE HAD MADE.
Trial testimony indicated that although Appellant's mother
made an :initial down payment of approximately $3600 on the West
Ogden real estate :in December 1976, (R., p.105, l:ines 6-9)
Appellant and not his mother had ma.de all subsequent, m:mthly
contract payments. (R.,p.105, lines 14-17).

The several statements

made on page 5 of Appellant's Brief are· clearly leading questions
posed to Appellant and to his mother by Appellant's counsel and
suggesting desired responses i.e. that Appellant's m::>ther had a one-
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half :interest in said real estate.
Further it is clear that Appellant's business "Transactions
Transmiss:!-ons" which operated upon the West Ogden real estate was
a sole proprietorship in the names of Appellant and Respondent as
reflected on Schedule C of their joint federal income tax retunl..
Depreciation of approximately $1800 was claimed by Appellant
and Respondent for 1978 upon the building purportedly purchased by
Appellant and his mther. (R. , p. 36) . At trial Appellant stated
that he had an arrangement with his mother whereby he would claim
the depreciation on the West Ogden property for certain years and
his rrother for others, but under questioning from the court,
admitted that his mother had never yet claimed depreciation on
that building. (R.,p.118, lines 3-12).

Appellant's mother, Mrs.

Cato, did not testify that she was to take depreciation on the
building for certa:in years as was testified to by Appellant, but
that Appellant and Respondent had taken all depreciation thereon.
(R.,p.147, lines 5-6).
The marital income of Appellant and Respondent was used
to make all payments on the West Ogden real estate subsequent
to its purchase in December 1976.

The $9200 gross income from

the Transaction Transmission business :in 1978 actually reflected
a final loss of $1200 approx:iJil.ately after off-sets for depreciation,
real proper'Q; taxes, etc. In fact, Schedule C reflects a payment
of $375 for 1978 by Appellant and Respondent for property taxes on
the build:ing purportedly purchased by Appellant and his mother as
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partners. (R. ,p.36).

It is apparent that notwithstanding Mr's.

Cato's name being on the purchase contract, in reality, Appellant
dealt with the real estate as a marital asset which he held with
Respondent rather than as a partnership asset which he held with
his rrother.

In discussing the value of the West Ogden real estate

at trial, reference was made to Appellant repaying his mother
for her $3600 down payment assummg the value to be the same
as when purchased. (R.,p.106, lines 24-27).

This dialogue

between Appellant and his counsel suggests that even though
there may have been little or no equity in the property the
Appellant desired to take marital assets to repay his roother the
$3600 for her down payment.

This would indicate that Appellant

considered that down payment to be in the form of a loan as
opposed to a true partnership interest.
18-26).

See also (R. , p .119 , lines

That such was the true intent of Appellant and his mother

is buttressed by the adnission by Appellant that other items
of marital property i.e. a motorcycle and van purportedly sold by
Appellant to his nnther in 1977 without the knowledge or consent
of Respondent for the nominal price of $100 each were in reality
security transactions securing the loan of those funds to Appellant
rather than actual sales. (R.,p.104, lines 1-7).

It is subnitted

that Mrs. Cato's interest in the West Ogden real estate was.in
essence a similar security transaction reflected in the $3600
down payment advanced by Mrs. Cato.

Accordingly the stipulated

appraised value of the West Ogden real estate of $57,500 in September
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1979 (R.,p.52) less the mortgage balance of $39,000 (R. ,p.132, lines
27-29) less Mrs. Cato's $3600 down payment correctly reflected a
marital asset of $14,900 in the West Ogden property.
POINT II - THE TRIAL COURr DID Nor OVERVALUE THE TRANSACTION
TRANSMISSIONS BUSINESS AWARDED TO APPEI.LANT.
It is plain from the evidence presented at trial that very
low values were ascribed to the various vehicles which Appellant
admitted he owned.

Specifically illustrating this undervaluation

is the testimony conceming the 1965 Chevrolet Corvair.

estimated its value at $700 (R. ,p. 97, iines 1-19).

Appellant

However, Respondent

testified that Appellant had refused to sell this car to an
interested neighbor inasmuch as it was an antique and vintage car
in very good condition which Appellant advised Respondent was

'WOrth up to $2,000. (R.,p.126, lines 6-26).

It is apparent

that the trial court believed Respondent's testimony regarding
the value of the 1965 Corvair which perogative the court 1'.ad
every right to exercise.

Using Appellant's own assigned values

for the 1965 Buick i.e. $600 (R. ,p.87, lines 19-24), the 1949
Studebaker i.e. $200 (R. ,p.87, lines 25-27), 1963 International
truck i.e. $200 (R.,p.87, lines 28-30), and a 1966 Buick Riveria
i.e. $200 (R.,p.94, lines 3-15), coupled with Respondent's
testimmy regarding the $2, 000 value of the 1965 Corvair (R. , p .126,
lines 16-26), annunts to $3200 worth of autom:Jbiles.
In addition, specifically reflected in Schedule C of the

federal income tax retum of Appellant and Respondent (R. , p. 37) is
some $750 in tools depreciated in the Transaction Transmissions
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business and acquired since 1973.

Finally, the boat, trailer and

notor which were also purportedly sold to Appellant's nother in
1977 for $100 (R. ,p.41) and which had a recognized purchase value
of approximately $900 (R. ,p. 91, lines 13-23) were not specifically
provided for in the trial courts' distribution of assets.

These

items may well have been considered part of the paraphenalia
and accoutrements connected with the transmission business,
especially in light of Appellant rs testim:my that although the
boat remained at Appellant's home until the divorce action in
March 1979, it should have been at the garage along with the
van and cycle. (R.,p.88, lines 14-26).

The purported sale of

the boat to Appellant's mother on May 26, 1977 is identical to that
of the nntor cycle and van,, (R.,pp.41-43), and it is submitted
a similarly intended security transaction only.

Adding the

$3200 of vehicles, $750 of tools and $900 representing the boat,
trailer and motor, totals $4850 which is very near the $5,000 $6,000 value assigned by the trial court to Transaction Transmissions
business.

The $4850 figure does not take into account any

higher values the trial court may have ascribed to the vehicles
owned by Appellant other than the 1965 Corvair.

Also, the $4850

figure does not consider what value, if any, court gave to the
good-will of the business itself.

It is submitted that the business

interests and property involved in the Transaction Transmissions
business awarded to Appellant were not overvalued.
The valuation error assigned by Appellant regarding the
fumiture of the parties is minor and without merit regarding
Appellant's request that this matter be remanded for a roore
equitable distribution and award of property.

Appellant ascribed
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a purported value of $2,000 to the furniture including in his
calculations reference to a color T.V. (R.,p.107, lines 6-16).
Respondent. in her testimony gave the furniture an approxill1ate
value of $1700 although she emphasized that the color T.V.
was 15 - 20 years old and not W'Orking. (R. ,p.127, lines 8-24 and
p.128, line 8).

The court could correctly consider the non-

functional T. V. in arriving at the $1500 figure.

Finally, the

minor variance in value between the $4850 figure for the "Transaction
Transmissions" business and the $5,000 - $6,000 value given by
the court and the $1700 value of the furniture given by
Respondent and the $1500 figure used by the court are more than
offset by the actual Civil Service Retirement accUt!D.llated by
Appellant of $5425 (R. ,p.80 lines 8-12) versus the $5,000 figure
used by the court. (R. , P. 55)

POINT III - TIIE TRIAL COURI' HAS BRO.AD LATITUDE .AND DISCfil:TION
m EQUITY MATI'ERS SUCH AS DIVORCE ACTIONS AND THE RESULTANI'
DISTRIBurION OF MARITAL ASSETS.
Two of the cases cited in Appellant's Brief clearly
reflect this position.

In English v English 265 P2d 409 (Utah

1977) the Court reaffinned its long standing position that the
trial court in a divorce action has considerable latitude and
discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests
and the party appealing therefrom has the burden o·f proving that
there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error or that the
evidence clearly preponderated against the findings or that
such a serious inequity resulted such as to manifest a clear
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abuse of discretion.

In English the only mdification ma.de

with respect to the property of the parties was the reduction
of al:inrJny from $2,000 to $1,000 per nonth, as opposed to the
elimination of alimony, which reduced alim:my the Court found
reasonable in view of a 20 year marriage, the husband's eamings,
etc~

In the instant case now on appeal despite a 16 year marriage

and acknowledged superior earn:lllg capacity of the Appellant i.e.
$17,154 vs. $4,145 of Respondent in 1978 (R.,p.78, line 6-7 and
p.80, lines 18-30), ro alimony was awarded.

Instead the trial court

adopted the position of Respondent that instead of receiving a
50% interest in all marital assets of the parties together with
reasonable alim:my (R. ,pp.·133-134), Respondent would be willing
to waive her right to alim:m.y and receive the equity in the
family home together with its furnishings, her automobile,
and her smaller Civil Service Retirement Fund and allow Appellant
to receive the entire equity in the West Ogden real estate
together with his Transaction Transmissions business, all tools,
paraphenalia and accoutrements and automobiles connected
therewith and his greater accumulated Civil Service retirement.
(R. ,p.141).

The other case cited by Appellant DeRose v DeRose 426 P2d
211 (Utah 1967) strongly supports the Judg}Dent of the trial court
in this appeal.

In DeRose the trial court had split the assets

of the parties with the provision that the def end.ant-husband
receive a one-half equity interest in the family home at such time
as the youngest child reached his majority or the wife remarried.
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This Court mdified the trial court judgment by awarding the
wife the total equity in the family home stating that the basic
objective.of the decree is to make such an arrangement of
property and economic resources of the parties in order that
they will have the best possible opportunity to reconstruct
their lives on a happy and useful basis and minimize friction.
Again, :in DeRose there was a clear disparity in the earning
capacity of the husband and wife as has already been acknowledged
by Appellant between himself and Respondent in this appeal.

Further

:in this appeal Respondent testified that she regularly cooked
meals, did the laundry and the regular household chores (R.,p.142,
lines 25-27), and had only worked full-time outside the family
home for a period of one year dur:ing the 16 year marriage, (R. , p .143.

l:ines 1-2).
Utah is not a no-fault state.

In this case it clearly

appears that the precipitating cuase of this divorce was Respondent
finding Appellant parked in a car at 2:00 A.M. kissing another
woman, (R. ,p.130, line 12),

coupled with Appellant's physical

beating of Respondent and his threat to kill her. (R. , p. 131,
lines 9-11).

This was a fact that the trial court could properly

consider in its distribution of property to the parties.
The trial court had the opportunity to hear the testimony
of witnesses and to obser\Te their candor or lack thereof and
judge their credibility.

In cases of conflict the Supreme Court

assume that the trial court believed the evidence which supported
its findings.

Deference should be given to the trial court and
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its decision upheld unless there clearly appears manifest and
substantial error prejudicing the parties.

Allen v Allen 165 P2d

872 (Utah .1946) ; Harding v Harding 488 P2d 308 (Utah 1971) ; Stone
v Stone 431 P2d 802 (Utah 1967).

Clearly no such error occurred

in the pending appeal.

CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly ruled that the West Ogden real
estate was a marital asset of the parties in the anount of
·$14,900 after giving credit to Appellant's m:>ther for her $3600
down payment which represented Mrs. Cato's sole financial

contribution to said real estate.

All m:mthly payments and

property taxes upon the subject real estate were ma.de from the
marital income of Appellant and Hespondent.

Additionally,

all depreciation of said real estate has been claimed by Appellant
and Respondent in the sole proprietorship, "Transaction Transmissions",
as reflected on Schedule C. of their federal income tax return.
The trial court correctly valued the Transaction Transmissions
business at $5, 000 - $6, 000.

hly variations therefrom were

very minor in nature and were more than offset by the actual,
accrued Civil Service Retirement of Appellant in the amount of
$5425 versus $5,000 mentioned by the court in its award of property.
The trial court has broad latitude and discretion in divorce
matters and may properly consider the significant disparity in
eaming capacity between Appellant and Respondent and the fault
of the respective parties in ma.king its distribution of _property.
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Accordingly, the Respondent respectfully asks this Court to
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

DA'l1ID this

Io

)

day of July, 1980.

Respectfully submitted,

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I

I hereby certify that on this

ii
I

.

day of July, 1980,

I hand delivered a copy of the foregoing document to the office

of Appellant's attorney, Jane A. Marquardt, 543 25th Street,

~!

Ogden, Utah 84401.

"";

-----=--12~;p;~t:

~-----.-.___,-TIM

W.

~
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